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STRIKING THE BALANCE: SEARCH 
WARRANTS AND ENCRYPTION 
PROTECTED SMARTPHONES 
BY NICHOLAS A. OLIVA1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are the parent of a dead 15-year-old girl whose 
life has just been cut short by a stray bullet.  You have been up for 
days now, and you find yourself sitting in the hall of the New York 
County District Attorney’s Office.  The door of one of the assistant 
district attorney’s offices opens, and you take a seat in front of her 
across from a large, mahogany desk.  
The attorney tells you she has good news and bad news.  The 
good news: a suspect is being questioned.  The bad news: they have 
not been to access crucial information implicating the suspect in 
the shooting because the information is being stored on an iPhone 
6s, and they could not bypass the privacy protection on the 
encrypted iPhone.2 The only way to gain access to the phone is to 
get suspect to cooperate—but the truth is that simply will not 
happen.  She informs you that without the information on the 
phone, the attorney will not have enough evidence to prosecute 
your daughter’s murderer.  This is exactly the balancing of rights 
the courts face when approaching smartphone searches: will the 
interest of the citizen, or of law enforcement prevail?  Just as the 
hypothetical illustrates — “privacy comes at a cost.”3 
 
1 J.D. Candidate, St. John’s University School of Law, 2018.  
2 See Emma Raviv, Homing in: Technology’s Place in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 612 (2015) (stating that encryption takes the 
text contained in the document, and converts it into ciphertext (encrypted text), which can 
only be converted into plaintext (readable text) with the correct encryption key); see 
generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding warrantless 
wiretaps were constitutional because there was neither a physical invasion nor an official 
search and seizure of a person). 
3 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (stating “[w]e cannot deny that our 
decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime. Cell 
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We need not further hypothesize.  Manhattan District Attorney 
Cyrus Vance recently reported that law enforcement was unable 
to execute search warrants on smartphones in over a hundred 
instances because the devices were running iOS 84 software that 
encrypts the cell phone’s data.5 More often than not, the 
information guarded by the smartphone’s encryption software is 
not just useful, but it is often crucial.6 Moreover, these cases do 
not just concern low-level crimes, but include homicides, 
attempted murders, sexual abuse of a child, sex trafficking, 
assault, and robbery.7 The words of a family who had the life of a 
loved one stolen by a murderer put the stakes of this issue into 
perspective:  
It hurts us every day to know that the identity of my sister’s 
killer remains sitting inside a phone in an evidence room. As a 
family, we call on our elected leaders to pass comprehensive 
legislation to allow law enforcement access to valuable 
information. We ask this for victims’ families like ours, who live in 
pain every day. We owe this fight to my sister and nephew, and for 
all of our nation’s victims and their family members, as well.8 
Shortly after Cyrus Vance released that report, the law 
enforcement crisis with encrypted smartphones made national 
 
phones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and communication among 
members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incriminating information about 
dangerous criminals.”).  
4 CYRUS VANCE, JR., REPORT OF MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ON 
SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY, at 1 (2015) (stating “[i]n September 2014, 
Apple Inc. announced that its new operating system, iOS 8, would be designed such that 
when a phone or other device running iOS 8 locks, no one but the user or another person 
with the device’s passcode, could open it.”).  
5 Id. at 9.  
6 Id. (emphasis added). 
7 Id.  
8 District Attorney Vance, NYPD, Crime Victims’ Advocates Call on Congress to 
#UnlockJustice, MANHATTANDA.ORG (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.manhattanda.org/ 
district-attorney-vance-nypd-crime-victims-advocates-call-congress-unlockjustice/16/ 
(providing statements from Ernie Allen, Founding Chairman, former President, and CEO 
of the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, who stated “We need to find the 
right balance,” Joyful Heart Foundation Managing Director Sarah Haacke Byrd, who 
stated “Leaders, including policymakers, law enforcement, victim advocates, and survivors, 
must come together to work with technology companies to ensure that law enforcement has 
the necessary tools at its disposal to fully investigate crimes and to hold violent offenders 
accountable. Jointly we must examine how current encryption policies, while attempting to 
preserve privacy, may be diminishing the ability of law enforcement from doing all that 
they can to seek justice for victims of sexual assault, domestic violence and child abuse, and 
provide some level of closure for their families.”).   
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headlines with the San Bernardino shooting.  On December 2, 
2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, killed 14 
people and wounded another 24 people in an act of domestic 
terrorism.9 A crucial piece of information was recovered—Farook’s 
cellphone.10 The subsequent investigation centered around the cell 
phone, because the hope was that the phone would provide 
evidence of the shooters’ possible motives, co-conspirators or 
accomplices, as well as other crucial information that could 
explain their heinous act of violence.11 Just as in the hypothetical 
case described above, law enforcement was unable to access the 
recovered cell phone because they did not have the necessary 
passwords, and the terrorists themselves had been shot and killed 
in a hail of bullets after fleeing the carnage they created.  
At the core of the legal dispute between the FBI and Apple lies 
an issue that has been developing for over a decade with the 
development of password encryption: what are the consequences 
when the government’s ability to search a private citizen’s 
smartphone is compromised, and thus, there is less access to the 
extensive information stored on such devices?12 What grabbed 
headlines was the fact that the FBI requested the Court to order 
Apple to “Assist Agents in Search.”13 Essentially, the FBI wanted 
Apple to provide three things: (1) access to the recovered iPhone 
by means of bypassing or disabling any function that could wipe 
out all the information on the phone; (2) unlimited chances to try 
to crack the iPhone’s code by connecting it to a port, or using 
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi or any other means that would allow such a 
 
9 Richard Pérez-Peña & Adam Goldman, ‘It Finally Clicked That This Wasn’t an 
Exercise’: Report Recounts San Bernardino Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/us/it-finally-clicked-that-this-wasnt-an-exercise-
report-recounts-san-bernardino-shooting.html?_r=0. 
10 Id. 
11 See In re Search of an Apple IPhone Seized During Execution of a Search Warrant 
on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 
618401, at 1 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
12 See Apple Inc’s Mot. to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opp’n to Government’s Mot. to Compel Assistance, In re Search of an Apple 
Iphone Seized During the Execution of A Search Warrant on a Black Lexus Is300, 
California License Plate 35kgd203., 2016 WL 767457 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
13 See In re Search of an Apple IPhone Seized During Execution of a Search Warrant 
on a Black Lexus IS300, supra note 11 at 1.  
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function; and (3) neutralization of function on iPhones that sets a 
time delay after a number of incorrect passcode attempts.14   
Apple responded to this demand by recognizing two major 
considerations that are in tension with one another: the need for 
law enforcement to be armed with as much information as possible 
in order to be effective and the rights of private citizens to be 
secure in their possessions, namely their cell phones.15 Apple saw 
this request as the FBI’s attempt to compromise its product’s 
security functions, which would allow a password to be input 
electronically to unlock that device.16 If Apple was to enable the 
FBI to use “brute force”17 tactics in order to unlock the iPhone, it 
would amount to the government simply “compel[ling] Apple to 
create a crippled and insecure product.” 18 Moreover, Apple feared 
the promulgation of that product onto the market, because it 
anticipated it would create privacy concerns for millions of iPhone 
users who would be now vulnerable not just to government 
infringement of privacy, as well as “provide[] an avenue for 
criminals and foreign agents” to access such information.19 
Compliance with such an order would compromise the integrity of 
their product, and be outright unconstitutional. 
This note addresses the various issues presented by the 
obstacles data encryption has created for law enforcement by 
placing in tension the American citizen’s right to privacy through 
the use of data encryption, and law enforcement’s ability to 
conduct lawful searches through the use of warrants.  Essentially, 
my proposal sets out to do two things: (1) ensure the protections 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to United States Citizens; 
 
14 Id. The original language of the FBI’s request of Apple to “Assist Agent in Search” 
stated:  
(1) it will bypass or disable the auto-erase function whether or not it has been enabled; (2) 
it will enable the FBI to submit passcodes to the subject device for testing electronically via 
the physical device port, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or other protocol available on the subject device; 
and (3) it will ensure that when the FBI submits passcodes to the subject device, software 
running on the device will not purposefully introduce any additional delay between 
passcode attempts beyond what is incurred by the Apple hardware. 
15 Apple Inc’s Mot. To Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, 
and Opp’n to Govt’s Mot. To Compel Assistance, supra note 12 at 2. 
16 Id. at 7. 
17 Id. at 2 (“‘[B]rute force’ [operates by] trying thousands or millions of passcode 
combinations with the speed of a modern computer.”). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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and (2) give law enforcement a viable avenue to investigate crimes, 
while simultaneously providing Apple the security that the 
privacy of its customers will be as protected as it has ever been 
through carefully tailored legislation.  
This note’s analysis of searches of encrypted cell phone will be 
broken down into in three parts.  Part I of this note provides 
context for the balance between individual privacy and law 
enforcement by reviewing general Fourth Amendment principles 
and then Supreme Court rulings that apply these principles to cell 
phones.  Part II then details the advancements in cell phone 
technology, specifically encryption.  These new technologies 
render the data on cell phones inaccessible and lead law 
enforcement to go beyond search warrants and seek special orders 
pursuant to the All Writs Act.  Part II provides an overview of the 
All Writs Act and the leading cases that define its scope and 
concludes that the act does not provide a power to courts to order 
the decryption of cell phones.  Part III then asserts why a judicial 
response is inadequate to address the issues caused by encryption, 
and why new legislation is needed that will effectively and 
lawfully strike the balance between the interests surrounding 
data encryption on smartphones.  
 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF 
SMARTPHONE TECHNOLOGY 
 
A. Fourth Amendment Background 
 
Every citizen of the United States has the right to be free from 
unreasonable government intrusion.20 This right is derived from 
the Fourth Amendment that provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
 
20 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. 
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describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.21 
Essentially, the government is required to obtain a warrant 
from a judge and that warrant must be supported by probable 
cause prior to executing a search or seizure.  Moreover, depending 
on the circumstances of the case, evidence obtained without 
satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment mandates will be excluded 
from court proceedings.22  
In 1928, in Olmstead the Court ruled that the rights of a citizen 
against unreasonable searches and seizures were only violated 
when there was a physical intrusion into one’s property.23 Thus, it 
was held that a warrantless wiretap that was placed on the street 
outside the defendant’s home, among other places did not violate 
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and 
seizures were not activated.24    
Four decades later in Katz,25 this Court further clarified when 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply.  Once again, the 
Court wrestled with a wiretap device, but this time it was placed 
on the outside of a public telephone booth without a warrant and 
used to eavesdrop on a conversations made with the public 
telephone.26  The government contended that because there was 
“no physical penetration,” into the defendant’s property, there was 
no intrusion that triggers the Fourth Amendment.27  However, the 
Court agreed with the Petitioner’s assertion that notwithstanding 
the absence of “‘technical trespass,’”28 the government violated the 
defendant’s constitutional rights because “what he sought to 
 
21 Id. 
22 See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 796–97, (1984) (quoting Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), “The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence 
obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered 
and found to be derivative of an illegality or “fruit of the poisonous tree.”). 
23 See Raviv, supra note 2 at 595; see also, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
478 (1928).  
24 See Raviv, supra note 2 at 595; see also, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 478. 
25 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967). 
26 See id. at 349. 
27 Id. at 352.   
28 Id. at 353 (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects not only the seizure of 
tangible items, but also extends to recordings of oral statements overheard as well, despite 
the absence of physical intrusion).  
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exclude . . . was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.”29 
In so deciding, the Court explained that “[t]he Fourth amendment 
protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”30 Thus, the Court departed from the 
narrowly construed principles of Olmstead in favor of a more 
contemporary view that derived from the evolution of the “vital 
role” the public telephone had come to play in communications.31 
Therefore, Katz’s Fourth Amendment protections were deemed 
to be activated because: “first[,] [he] exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation [was] one that society [was] prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”32 This framework has endured the test of time, and 
continues to inform the application of the Fourth Amendment, 
even with the continuing advancements in technology in the last 
few decades.  
The Supreme Court of the United States has extended this line 
of reasoning to encompass the reasonable expectation of privacy 
that a citizen has in the contents of their cell phone.33 In Riley, the 
Court held that in order to search an individual’s cell phone 
incident to a lawful arrest, “[a] warrant is generally required.”34 
This decision recognized that modern cell phones had an  
“immense storage capacity” greater than anything ever been 
encountered by the judiciary before, such as a cigarette pack, a 
wallet, or a purse.35  
The Riley Court was extremely cognizant of the imminent 
expansion of the capacity of smartphones.36 Because of this 
capacity, tension continues to grow between the private citizen 
trying to protect their information on smartphones, and law 
enforcement’s interest of being able to access pertinent 
information relating to law enforcement investigations. While the 
 
29 Id. at 352.  
30 Id. at 353.   
31 See id. at 352.  
32 Id. at 361.  
33 See United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that “cell 
phones contain a wealth of private information,” and, as a result, individuals have a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in them). 
34 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). 
35 See id. at 393. 
36 See id. at 394 (“We expect that the gulf between physical predictability and digital 
capacity will only continue to widen in the future”).  
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Riley Court ultimately deemed the contents of a smartphone 
subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant 
requirement,37 it fell short of giving the law enforcement guidance 
on how to approach the execution of warrants on encrypted cell 
phones.  
Investigators soon realized that search warrants, even when 
granted, did not guarantee access.  In the words of FBI director 
James Comey during his address of a Congressional Committee, 
“[u]ntil [smartphone encryption], there was no closet in America, 
no safe in America, no garage in America, no basement in America 
that could not be entered with a judge’s order.”38 However, 
password encryption changed all that.  Accordingly, Comey 
argued, we have come to a point where the individual privacy 
interests of a citizen to be secure in the contents of their phone by 
using data encryption, must give way to the interest of security 
when law enforcement obtains a valid search warrant to access 
that very same information.39  
While a valid search warrant would legally permit the law 
enforcement to access information on a cell phone,40 it does not 
provide physical access.  For an encrypted cell phone, only the 
password will allow law enforcement to access the necessary 
information.  Most of the time criminals do not willingly divulge 
their passwords; the next step after securing the proper Fourth 
Amendment search warrant then is judicially compelling the 
assistance of the producers of the encryption technology.  A 
thorough understanding of how law enforcement traditionally 
obtained such assistance in similar, earlier circumstances is the 
logical starting point.   
 
 
 
37 Id. at 386.   
38 Nancy Dillon, FBI May Have Different Way to Access San Bernardino Shooter’s 
Phone, May Not Need Apple’s Hack Help, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Mar. 22, 2016, 8:27 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/fbi-access-san-bernardino-shooter-phone-
article-1.2572539.  
39 See The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy, Hearing 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 79 (2016) (statement of Hon. James B. 
Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).  
40 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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B.  Examination of Government Interaction With Third Party 
Intermediaries, And the Changes Spurred By The Development Of 
Smartphone Technology  
 
1. Compelling the Assistance of Third-Party Intermediaries  
 
Traditionally, law enforcement was able to circumvent the 
efforts of targets that were trying to hide information crucial to 
investigations, because this information would necessarily pass 
through third-party intermediaries, such as telephone companies 
or banks.41 In cases concerning third-party intermediaries, the 
subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy was determined to be 
lost by virtue of their “voluntarily” turning over, or “knowingly 
expo[sing]” that information to a third party.42 Accordingly, the 
Court has determined the search or seizure of that information 
would be lawful, as the user of the third-party intermediaries 
essentially assumed the risk that such data would, in one way or 
another, not be kept private.  
New York Telephone Co. illustrates this concept.43 There, the 
FBI suspected that a particular location in a Manhattan 
neighborhood was home to a gambling operation.44 Under the 
authority of a federal statute known as the All Writs Act, the FBI 
subsequently motioned the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York to order the New York Telephone 
Company to install a pen register that would record the telephone 
numbers that were being called or received from that location.45 
The district court judge found there was probable cause to issue 
an All Writs order to compel New York Telephone to provide the 
necessary technical assistance required to install the pen 
 
41 See Raviv, supra note 2, at 595.  
42 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (finding no expectation of 
privacy where documents voluntarily given to bank); see also In re U.S. for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 723 F.3d 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press 
v. Am. Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1043 (D.C. Cir.1978) “‘To the extent an 
individual knowingly exposes his activities to third parties, he 
surrenders Fourth Amendment protections . . . .’”).  
43 See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
44 Id. at 161-62.  
45 See id. at 161, 163. 
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register.46 New York Telephone complied, but subsequently 
appealed the order by arguing that the government did not have 
power to compel such assistance under the All Writs Act.47 
Ultimately, the Court upheld the decision of the District Court 
in finding that that the All Writs Act empowered the Court to 
compel an order of assistance from the telephone company.48 The 
Court laid out three elements that are necessary to determine if 
assistance is warranted: (1) whether the intermediary is too 
attenuated from the situation; (2) whether compelling assistance 
is unreasonably burdensome; and (3) whether assistance is 
necessary to effectuate the warrant.49 In its analysis, the Court 
found that the order for assistance was closely related to the 
controversy as the company had direct control over the medium of 
communication.50 Moreover, the court reasoned that the company 
was not burdened by providing such “meager assistance” to the 
FBI.51 Finally, the court order was proven to be necessary because 
there was “no conceivable way” that the FBI would be able to 
execute this operation without the help of New York Telephone 
Co.52 Accordingly, the Court’s order was found to be constitutional, 
and the order to compel New York Telephone Co.’s assistance, 
proper. 53 
New York Telephone Co., stands for the broader proposition that 
law enforcement has always had a reliable way to physically 
access to even guarded information because of the power granted 
by the All Writs Act to compel the assistance of third party 
intermediaries.54 However, with the introduction of data 
 
46 Id. at 162. “A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on 
a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is 
released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are 
actually completed.” Id. at 161 n.1 A pen register is “usually installed at a central telephone 
facility [and] records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from [the] line” to which it is 
attached. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  
47 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162-63.  
48 See id. at 172.  
49 See id. at 160. 
50 See id. at 174. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. at 175 (1977). 
53 See id. at 177-78. 
54 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); but see U.S. v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 676 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding 
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encryption, the strategy of simply subpoenaing information from 
third party intermediaries has become essentially obsolete, if not 
impossible.55 
 
2. Default Encryption Has Made The Traditional Methods of 
Compelling the Assistance of Third Party Intermediaries 
Outdated 
 
Smartphone encryption is a product of the advancements made 
by society in the realm of technology.  For example, in 2011, 
smartphone ownership was a mere 35% amongst adults.56 By 
2015, that number had nearly doubled to 68%.57 This huge growth 
of smartphone ownership was accompanied by the public’s 
demand to have the strongest possible privacy and security 
protections.58 Apple, for example, has been happy to provide just 
that.  Apple has been at the forefront of protecting the privacy of 
its customers through the use of encryption, which is evident in 
their privacy policy published online that reads:  
Encryption protects trillions of online transactions each day. 
When you’re shopping, paying a bill, or using iMessage or 
FaceTime, you’re using encryption. It turns your data into 
indecipherable text that can be read only by those with the right 
key . . . We also refuse to add a backdoor into any of our products.59 
The use of cell phones has become extremely prevalent in 
society, so much so “that the proverbial visitor from Mars might 
conclude that they were an important feature of human 
anatomy.”60 However, the same impetus for the creation of such 
 
that an area readily open to the public does not create a right of access such that the 
person’s expectation of privacy is automatically compromised).  
55 See Raviv, supra note 2, at 612 (“Once encrypted, an Internet communication is 
practically impossible to decrypt by guessing—such a process would “occupy a 
supercomputer for millions of years”).  
56 See David M. Lenz, Is the Cloud Finally Lifting? Planning for Digital Assets, ALI 
CLE EST. PLAN. COURSE MATERIALS J. 35, 35 (Feb. 2017).  
57 Id.  
58 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Act | the App Association in Support of Apple Inc.’s Motion 
to Vacate Order Compelling Assistance, In re Search of an Apple IPhone Seized during the 
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 
35KGD203., 2016 WL 1228636 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
59 Apple’s Privacy Policy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-
privacy/#safe-device (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). 
60 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). 
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encryption has created an even greater concern for law 
enforcement.  
Prominent political figures and heads of law enforcement have 
come forth to voice their concerns regarding the encryption of 
information contained on cell phones because of the formidable 
obstacle they present to criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
President Barrack Obama has addressed the issue of encryption 
by stating: 
[I]f we get into a situation which the technologies do not allow 
us at all to track somebody we’re confident is a terrorist … and 
despite knowing that information, despite having a phone number 
or social-media address or email address, that we can’t penetrate 
that, that’s a problem.61 
The director of the FBI, James Comey, has also voiced concerns 
with regard to tech giants like Apple and Google on “going dark” 
which creates barriers for law enforcement to gather information 
to prevent the next terrorist attack.62At the State level, District 
Attorney Cyrus Vance has voiced similar concerns with regard to 
the cases that enter Manhattan courtrooms each and every day. 
Vance has stated that hundreds of criminal cases are harmed by 
encryption software that can be found on the phones of criminals.63 
Prior to the advancements that software designers made in 
encryption, law enforcement agencies were able to engage in 
various methods to try to “crack” the encrypted devices.64 One such 
method utilized by law enforcement is called a “brute force 
attack.”65 This method of code cracking involves a computer trying 
every key combination in an effort to find the correct password 
 
61 Cody M. Poplin, President Obama Comments on Back-doors in Encryption, LAWFARE 
(Jan. 16, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://bit.ly/1nsk5P1 (“[The President] continued by not[ing] the 
difficult and sometime tenuous balance between security, liberty, and privacy, and stated 
that debate with civil libertarians and privacy groups had been “useful.”).  
62 See James Comey, Director, Fed. Bureau Investigations, Going Dark: Are Technology 
Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?, FBI (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-
on-a-collision-course.   
63 See Jamil N. Jaffer & Daniel J. Rosenthal, Decrypting Our Security: A Bipartisan 
Argument For a Rational Solution to the Encryption Challenge, 24 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 
273, 292 (2016).  
64 See generally J. Riley Atwood, The Encryption Problem: Why the Courts and 
Technology are Creating a Mess For Law Enforcement, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 407, 
411 (2015).   
65 See id.  
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that will unlock the encryption.66 However, the amount of time 
that this method takes can vary greatly depending on the 
complexity of the password, and can be anywhere from a few 
hours, to a few days, or even a few years, thereby causing the 
“brute force” method obsolete.67 
With Apple’s unwavering advocacy for the privacy rights of its 
customers, and law enforcement struggling to overcome 
encryption technology while also abiding by the Fourth 
Amendment in searches and seizures, former FBI director James 
Comey poses one simple question that puts the stakes of this issue 
into focus: “‘it’s only a matter of time before there’s an incident 
where we say, “Who gave [Apple CEO] Tim Cook the right to 
decide whether a parent can find a lost child?”‘“68 
 
II. THE SAN BERNARDINO TERRORIST’S  ENCRYPTED 
SMARTPHONE, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT’S INABILITY TO 
EXECUTE  LAWFUL WARRANTS THEREON 
 
A. The San Bernardino Attack 
 
The intersection between an individual’s right to privacy and the 
need for law enforcement to access encrypted data caught the 
national spotlight on December 2, 2015,69 at approximately 11:00 
a.m., when a group of co-workers gathered for training at the 
Inland Regional Center (“IRC”), in San Bernardino, California.70 
Suddenly, a door swung open, and a single masked person wearing 
all black, and carrying a firearm stepped inside the room.71 
Without a word, he began opening fire.72 Pandemonium ensued. 
Pandemonium ensued. A second shooter joined the attack, and 
 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Jaffer & Rosenthal, supra note 63, at 293. 
69 See RICK BRAZIEL, ET. AL., A CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW OF THE SAN BERNARDINO 
PUBLIC SAFETY RESPONSE TO DECEMBER 2, 2016, TERRORIST SHOOTING INCIDENT AT THE 
INLAND REGIONAL CENTER, 25 (2016). (“The IRC is a frequent training location for county 
departments because of the conference room’s large size and its close proximity to the 
county office building”). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 26.  
72 Id.  
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together they fired over 100 rounds.73 The attackers then fled in a 
black SUV, leaving behind death and destruction.74 
A short time later, officers spotted the same SUV miles away in 
a neighboring town. A sergeant, as well as undercover police 
officers that also happened to be in the area, attempted to execute 
a traffic stop on the SUV.75 The SUV refused to pull over.  After 
making a turn, the back window of the SUV shattered from within, 
as gunfire erupted from the vehicle.  The gunfire was aimed at the 
officers trailing close behind.76 An intense firefight ensued, with 
the shooters firing 81 rounds at police, and at least 440 shots being 
returned by police.77  Both shooters were killed. 
Afterwards, police proceeded to process the crime scene and 
discovered an encrypted iPhone in the shooter’s car.  Because both 
perpetrators were killed in the shootout, there was no way to 
access its contents.78 The FBI, worried about more attacks, 
“…promised to explore every investigative avenue in order to learn 
whether the San Bernardino suspects were working with others, 
were targeting others, or whether or not they were supported by 
others.”79 Officials applied for numerous search warrants80 to 
search the digital devices and online accounts of Syed Rizwan 
 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 27. 
75 Id. at 38. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 40.  
78 Joel Rubin, et al., FBI unlocks San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone and ends legal battle 
with Apple, for now, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016, 10:39 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-fbi-drops-fight-to-force-apple-to-unlock-san-
bernardino-terrorist-iphone-20160328-story.html.  
79 Id.  
80 Richard Winton, A year after the San Bernardino terror attack, the FBI is still 
struggling to answer key questions, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016, 2:25 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-san-bernardino-terror-probe-20161130-
story.html. Although Farook’s phone was owned by his employer, the San Bernardino 
County Department of Public Health, and despite the employer’s consent to execute a 
search of the phone, officials were unable to bypass the phone’s encryption software. The 
FBI has been unable to make attempts to determine the passcode because Apple has 
written, or “coded,” its operating systems with a user-enabled “auto-erase function” that 
would, if enabled, result in the permanent destruction of the required encryption key 
material after 10 erroneous attempts at the passcode (meaning that after 10 failed attempts 
at inputting the passcode, the information on the device becomes permanently 
inaccessible). When an Apple iPhone is locked, it is not apparent from the outside whether 
or not that auto-erase function is enabled; therefore, trying repeated passcodes risks 
permanently denying all access to the contents. See Rubin et al., supra note 78.   
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Farook (“Farook”), and his wife, Tashfeen Malik (“Malik”).81  Thus, 
the FBI turned to the All Writs Act, and the precedents of New 
York Telephone Co., and its progeny.  These efforts to access the 
iPhone only bolstered Apple’s privacy and business concerns — 
“th[at] [Apple] must contend with constant attempts by outside 
parties to worm past [their] security measures.”82 
 
B. The Order to Compel Apple’s Assistance in Accessing the 
Encrypted iPhone 
 
In order to Compel Apple’s assistance, the government relied on 
the All Writs Act. To understand the framework in which the 
Government and Apple were arguing, a brief overview and history 
of the All Writs Act, are necessary at this point.  
American courts have long had broad statutory authority to 
“carry out their duties of an independent judiciary by issuing the 
orders necessary to do so—even if Congress did not have the 
foresight to” explicitly proscribe the necessary procedural 
mechanisms that would effectuate those orders.83 The All Writs 
Act was initially enacted by the First Congress in 1789, and 
provided:  
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall 
have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeus corpus, and all 
other writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be 
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and 
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.84 
The Act has only been amended twice in the succeeding 
centuries, but only in form, never in substance.85 When the Act 
has been amended, the statute’s text was simply modernized.  
Today, the Act provides “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts 
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable 
 
81 See Rubin et al., supra note 78.   
82 Id. 
83 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Adams v. United States 
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942) (stating “Unless appropriately confined by  
Congress, a federal court may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance 
of its duties, when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve 
the ends of justice entrusted to it.”). 
84 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 14 (1789). 
85 See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2018). 
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to the usages and principles of law.86 The statute confers on all 
federal courts the authority to issue orders where three 
requirements are satisfied:  
(1) The issuance of the write must be “in aid of” the issuing 
court’s jurisdiction;  
(2) The type of writ requested must be “necessary or 
appropriate” to provide such aid to the issuing jurisdiction; and  
(3) The issuance of the write must be “agreeable to the usages 
and principles of law.87 
It is important to note that some courts have not reached the 
New York Telephone Co. factors because they conclude that the 
Government’s request to compel assistance does not fall within the 
reach of the All Writs Act itself.88 However, in the San Bernardino 
action, the Government relied heavily on earlier applications of 
The All Writs Act and analogized facts in those cases, particularly 
New York Telephone Co., to the facts of their investigation and 
insisted that their request fell within the statute’s authority.89 
Apple disagreed, and in motion practice both sides focused on the 
three New York Telephone Co. factors necessary to allow lawful 
use of the All Writs Act.90  
 
1. Analysis of the Remoteness Factor of New York Telephone 
Co. 
 
The first factor asks whether Apple was “so far removed from 
the underlying controversy that its assistance could not be 
permissibly compelled.”91 The core of this issue rests on whether 
the mere fact that Apple designed, manufactured, and sold the 
 
86 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
87 Id.  
88 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 353-54 (holding that an order to compel 
assistance of the development of software to bypass iPhone encryption fell outside the 
power of the All Writs Act because “Congress has considered but declined to adopt [such 
broad power]—albeit without explicitly or implicitly prohibiting it—[and therefore] is not 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law”).  
89 Gov’t Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search at 6-8, In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 353-54 (2016) (No. 15-0451M), 2016 
WL 680288, at *1.  
90 Id.; Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 58, at 15, 20-21, 
27, 29. 
91 U.S. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977). 
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device in question is enough on its own to establish that its 
connection to the investigation is not too attenuated.92  
The Government asserted that Apple’s development of the 
device and subsequent placement of it into the stream of commerce 
was sufficient to establish the first factor of New York Telephone 
Co.93 The Government reasoned that since Apple wrote and 
manufactured the software that runs the phone—the same 
software preventing execution of the warrant—Apple has become 
uniquely able to modify and control restrictions on the iPhone that 
were hindering law enforcement’s ability to obtain critical 
information.94 Accordingly, the Government concluded that since 
Apple owns the very software that now must be used to enable the 
search ordered by the warrant, Apple is not too “far removed” from 
the situation and should be compelled to assist the government.95  
Conversely, Apple argued that its relationship to the San 
Bernardino attack is far too attenuated to satisfy the first prong of 
New York Telephone Co.96 Essential to its argument is the premise 
that “[t]he All Writs Act does not allow the government to compel 
a manufacturer’s assistance merely because it has placed a good 
into the stream of commerce.”97 Apple asserted that the All Writs 
Act, if used in such a way, would “eviscerate the ‘remoteness’ factor 
entirely” by allowing any company, no matter how attenuated its 
connection to criminal activity, to be held accountable and subject 
to compulsion to assist law enforcement.98 Accordingly, Apple 
found that it is too “far removed” and attenuated to compel its 
assistance.99  
The first issue to be considered is whether Apple’s relationship 
was sufficiently close to the attack that spurred the conflict 
between Government and Apple.  In New York Telephone Co., the 
Supreme Court found the remoteness factor to be satisfied where 
the telephone company’s property was “being used to facilitate a 
 
92 See Gov’t Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, supra note 89, at 6. 
93 See id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 7. 
96 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 20-21.  
97 Id. at 16. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 15. 
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criminal enterprise on a continuing basis.”100 Ownership of the 
device used to commit a crime is direct involvement.  Unlike New 
York Telephone Co. where the intermediary owned the facility that 
was being utilized for criminal communications, here, Apple has 
no ownership interest whatsoever in the phone that was used in 
the San Bernardino attack.101 
Even if one was to assume that Apple’s financial benefit from 
the product as a result of the sale of the phone to the consumer 
establishes some type of involvement, the sale profits alone should 
not be sufficient to satisfy the first prong of analysis.  The fact of 
the matter is, by the time the consumers were planning and 
executing the attack, Apple had no direct involvement. Moreover, 
Apple did not do anything to directly oppose the Government’s 
investigation of the matter; instead it simply decided to take no 
action.102 As a result, New York Telephone Co.,. would not find that 
Apple would be so closely related to the underlying crime to make 
compelling assistance under the All Writs Act appropriate.  
 
2. Analysis of Whether Compelling Assistance would be 
Unreasonably Burdensome  
 
The parties then turned to the second issue, namely, whether 
compelling assistance is unreasonably burdensome on Apple.  The 
Government argued that compelling Apple to assist in this 
situation would not require “inordinate effort, and [the 
Government would even offer] reasonable reimbursement” for its 
efforts.103 The Government further emphasized that Apple, in its 
ordinary course of business, would sometimes be required to write 
such code in response to subpoenas or other processes.104 Given 
 
100 U.S. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977). 
101 See id.; Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents 
in Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 15. 
102 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174; In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 366 
(E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 (“Apple has not conspired with Feng to make the data on his device inaccessible. More 
importantly, perhaps, it has not even done what the telephone company did in N.Y. Tel. 
Co.—namely, it has not barred the door to its property to prevent law enforcement agents 
from entering and performing actions they were otherwise competent to undertake in 
executing the warrant for themselves.”).  
103 Gov’ts Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, supra note 89, at 7.  
104 See id.  
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this fact, the Government argued that Apple could not possibly 
assert that the order could be overly burdensome.105 Additionally, 
Apple’s unique ability to develop such a software code would allow 
it to constrain any software developed for this instance to be 
“tailored for this particular phone,” thus presenting no danger of 
system malfunctions or disrupting business operations stemming 
from privacy concerns.106 
Apple asserted that the FBI’s order to compel assistance in this 
situation would be repugnant to Apple’s strong interest in 
maintaining the level of security that is associated with the brand-
value of its product.107 Essentially, this would impose a crippling 
burden on the business by destroying the data technology that 
Apple has spent years developing.108 As a practical matter, 
compliance with such an order would require Apple to write a new, 
previously non-existent code, which would demand engineers to 
design, create, test, and validate the compromised operating 
system.109 After that software was developed, Apple would then 
have to supervise the operation by the FBI to brute force crack the 
phone’s security.110 Such processes would also need to be logged 
and recorded in case Apple’s methodology is ever scrutinized.111 
Apple explained how this process of bypassing the passcode 
security of just one iPhone “diverts man hours and hardware and 
software from Apple’s normal business operations.”112 Apple also 
expressed its fear that if it was to comply with an order requiring 
Apple to develop previously non-existent software, it would set 
dangerous precedent that would require similarly situated 
technology companies to “do the government’s bidding in untold 
future criminal investigations” that would require the 
development of new “hacking” departments devoted solely for 
government purposes. 113 
 
105 See id. 
106 Id.   
107 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’ts Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 16-17. 
108 Id.   
109 Id. at 1, 2. 
110 See id.  
111 Id.  
112 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).  
113 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 18.  
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In considering whether compelling Apple’s assistance would be 
unreasonably burdensome, the crucial consideration is whether 
the nature of the assistance required is within the day to day 
operations of Apple’s business. Whereas the Court in New York 
Telephone Co., had found that the utilization of a pen register was 
not offensive to the business operations of the company because it 
regularly employed pen registers for the use of billing operations, 
detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law, the measures to 
break through its encryption technology is not part of the day-to-
day business operations of Apple.114 Moreover, implementation of 
such measures can substantially threaten Apple’s brand which is 
built on its highly effective security capabilities.  
Additionally, meeting the Government’s demands would burden 
Apple, not just with the responsibility of development of 
completely new software, but also, there would also be a 
displacement of labor hours that would be required to carry out 
the necessary development.115 As such, the Government’s 
contentions that Apple regularly develops software code is not 
comparable to the type of extensive decryption software that the 
Government is seeking here.  Accordingly, compelling Apple’s 
assistance is also unreasonably burdensome.   
 
3. Is Compelling Assistance Necessary to Effectuate the 
Warrant? 
 
Lastly, the Government asserted that Apple’s assistance is 
necessary to effectuate the search warrant on the subject device. 
In this case, the iPhone was suspected to have records of who was 
communicating with Farook up to and during the attacks in San 
Bernardino.  These communications were determined to be critical 
to law enforcement’s investigations, and inaccessible by any other 
means known to the government or Apple.116 Consequently, the 
Government asserted that Apple was the only entity that had the 
ability to assist the government in unlocking the iPhone, and 
ensuring the safety of the information contained therein. 117  
 
114 U.S. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1977). 
115 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 370.  
116 Gov’ts Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, supra note 58, at 8. 
117 See id. at 4. 
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On the other hand, Apple focused on distinguishing the 
circumstances at issue with those of New York Telephone Co. In 
New York Telephone Co., Apple argued that “there [was] no other 
conceivable way to effectuate the government’s objective.” 118 
However, in the case at hand, Apple asserted that the Government 
failed to show that it even sought out or received any technical 
assistance from alternate avenues with expertise in digital 
forensics.  Consequently, Apple argued failure to obviate the need 
to compel Apple’s assistance should foreclose the endeavor it 
pursues now.119 In so concluding, Apple demanded the District 
Court to view this issue as one in which required the Court to “to 
preserve certain rights at the expense of burdening law 
enforcement’s interest in investigating crimes and bringing 
criminals to justice.”120  
Moreover, Apple was opposed to idly accepting any argument 
that would have far-reaching policy consequences by stretching 
the All Writs Act for purposes more extensive than it was intended 
to address.121 While Apple recognized that the All Writs Act 
confers the courts the power to “issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable 
to the usages and principles of law,” here, Apple concluded that 
the Act simply became the “‘issu[uance] [of] ad hoc writs whenever 
compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less 
appropriate’”—which is expressly forbidden by the Act itself.122  If 
the courts were allowed to do so, Apple argued, the Government 
would essentially “short-circuit[] public debate on this 
controversy, [which is] seem[ingly] fundamentally inconsistent 
with the proposition that such important policy issues should be 
determined in the first instance by the legislative branch after 
public debate—as opposed to having them decided by the judiciary 
in sealed, ex parte proceedings.”123  
 
118 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’ts Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 15. 
119 See id. at 19-20. 
120 Id. at 22. 
121 See id. at 3. 
122 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’ts Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 15. 
123 Id. at 19. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2019  3:43 PM 
428 JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 32:4 
Consequently, while it is clear that Apple likely has significant 
ability to develop the necessary software to decrypt smartphones, 
there is nothing in the record that suggested the Government has 
sought alternative avenues of relief aside from the All Writs Act. 
Without such options having been explored, the Government could 
hardly argue that Apple’s assistance is necessary.  
 
III. DEVISING LEGISLATION TO ENSURE THE EXECUTION OF 
LAWFUL WARRANTS ON SMARTPHONES 
 
Ultimately, Apple was right, and its assistance was not 
necessary in the FBI investigation.  Instead, the FBI’s motion to 
compel Apple to lend its assistance in gaining access to the iPhone 
belonging to Farook was vacated because law enforcement was 
able to unlock the encryption software by utilizing third party 
resources.124 However, the issue of using the All Writs Act to 
compel companies to break their own encryption software is still 
unresolved in the courts.  Since October 8, 2015, the Government 
has submitted requests in nine other matters in the federal 
courts—in California alone—to compel Apple to bypass the 
passcode security of numerous devices.125 There is no easy legal 
resolution, and the issue is unlikely to be resolved through the All 
Writs Act. Instead, this Note proposes that the legislature would 
be best suited to shoulder the load of these weighty issues that 
have the potential of having widespread social repercussions by 
approving new legal innovations.  
 
 
 
 
 
124 Danny Yadron, FBI confirms it won’t tell Apple how it hacked San Bernardino 
shooter’s iPhone, GUARDIAN, (Apr. 28, 2016, 7:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2016/apr/27/fbi-apple-iphone-secret-hack-san-bernardino. FBI director James 
Comey had stated the cost of unlocking the encryption software cost more than what he 
would be paid during the rest of his tenure—upwards of a million dollars. Id.  
125 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
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A.   Existing Laws Are Ill-Equipped To Balance The          
Security Interests of Law Enforcement and Privacy 
Interests Of Citizens 
 
Never before has the Court encountered a device with such 
capacity for “storing and accessing a quantity of information, some 
highly personal, that no person would ever had on his person in 
hard-copy form.”126 Even if the judiciary attempted to answer this 
complex legal issue, the resolution would not achieve a satisfying 
outcome because a judicial resolution is limited to existing laws.  
A court can only “mechanically apply . . . rule[s] used in the pre-
digital era to a search of a cell phone.”127  
Justice Alito, concurring with the majority’s opinion in Riley, 
voiced his opinion on the issue of whether the judiciary was 
attempting to stretch its powers too far when he asserted that “it 
would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century 
were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt 
instrument of the Fourth Amendment.”128 Similarly, a judge 
presiding over a substantially similar issue regarding the United 
States’ government’s motion to compel assistance in the Eastern 
District of New York, ended his opinion by urging Congress and 
others in the legislative branch of government to take action in 
order to force this debate out of the courts, and force the “debate 
. . . [to] happen today . . . among legislators who are equipped to 
consider the technological and cultural realities of a world their 
predecessors could not begin to conceive.”129 Thus, a “new 
balancing of law enforcement and privacy interest” is called for in 
order to address this issue.130 The weight of this issue should fall 
squarely on the shoulders of the”[l]egislatures, elected by the 
people, [who] are in a better position than [the judiciary is] to 
assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and 
those that almost certainly will take place in the future.”131 Even 
Apple recognized the amicability of such a solution and advocated 
for a legislative solution in its own brief opposing a motion to 
 
126 Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. 373, 406-07 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
127 Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
128 Id. at 408 (Alito, J. concurring). 
129 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 376. 
130 Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. at 407 (Alito, J., concurring). 
131 Id. at 408. 
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compel assistance that was submitted to the Court by the FBI.132 
There, Apple asserted that instead of the government seeking to 
compel the creation of a compromised operating system, the FBI 
would be better served by the “pursu[it] [of] new legislation,” 
which it had not even attempted,133 rather than “back[ing] away 
from Congress and turning to the courts.”134 Courts and prominent 
law enforcement officials have suggested several approaches to 
analyzing how law enforcement may execute a lawfully obtained 
search warrant to obtain information thereon.135 The best course 
of action would be a bipartisan and cooperatively adapted 
legislation made by law enforcement and tech giants such as Apple 
and Google.  Such legislation must tend to the concerns of all 
interested parties—including the consumer—and dispel fears that 
it would undermine the privacy afforded by smartphone 
technology.136 The components of this proposal move to simply 
“restore the status quo before Apple’s IOS 8.” 137 
A successful solution requires a combination of two key 
components: (1) cryptographic envelope security and (2) high civil 
 
132 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 2. 
133 James B. Comey, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATEMENT BEFORE THE 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: Threats to the 
Homeland, (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/threats-to-the-homeland 
(explaining that “[t]he United States government is actively engaged with private 
companies to ensure they understand the public safety and national security risks that 
result from malicious actors’ use of their encrypted products and services. However, the 
administration is not seeking legislation at this time.”); Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order 
Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to 
Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 2. 
134 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 12, at 2. 
135 See Compliance with Court Orders Act, S._, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016) (discussion 
draft available at https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BAG16460.pdf); Digital 
Security Commission Act, H.R. 4615, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016) (text available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr4651/text/ih). Two pieces of federal 
legislation have been proposed, but they have not gained traction sufficient to be passed 
and affect meaningful change. The first bill was made in direct response to the San 
Bernardino terrorist attack and is named the “Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016.” 
See Compliance with Court Orders Act. The second piece of federal legislation, dubbed the 
“Digital Security Commission Act,” was fashioned in such a way to establish a “National 
Commission on Security and Technology” challenges in the legislative branch to examine 
“the intersection of security and digital security and communication technology in a 
systemic, holistic way.”  See Digital Security Commission Act. 
136 See Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ (asserting that “[o]nce created, the . . . [equivalent 
of a master key] could be used over and over again, on any number of devices”). 
137 See VANCE, JR., supra note 4, at 15. 
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penalties to be imposed on the consumers of encrypted smartphone 
technology.  Each of these components will be examined in turn in 
a legislative solution below.   
 
B. A Legislative Solution Would Strike The Balance Between 
The Competing Interests of Security And Privacy 
 
A legislative solution does not alter all the present Fourth 
Amendment requirements for ascertaining a warrant—the most 
important of which requires it to “particularly describe[e] the . . . 
things to be seized.”138 This particularity requirement creates a 
safeguard that prevents law enforcement from mistakenly 
searching a place other than what the magistrate authorized.  It 
minimizes the risk that officers executing search warrants will by 
mistake search a place other than the place intended by the 
magistrate.139  Implicit in these traditional requirements is the 
answer to Apple’s core concern, the center of which suspects the 
unbridled ability of law enforcement to gain access into iPhones 
that would open the floodgates, and compromise the privacy of 
millions.  These same rules lend their unwavering stability to the 
present-day searches justified by a valid search warrant on cell 
phones or other smart devices and does not change after the 
implementation of this legislation.  
Although Apple has voiced concern about overbroad authority of 
law enforcement, there is no evidence that the ability of law 
enforcement to execute lawful search warrants would be 
detrimental in any way.  Numerous forensic experts and 
technologists have concluded that the privacy concern voiced by 
Apple is unfounded140 because such software is useless without 
physical possession of the device that an individual seeks to 
decrypt.141 Therefore, naturally, such an option should be explored 
if it would render answers to these complex legal issues that, so 
far, have found no solution.  
 
 
138 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. 
139 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.5,  5th ed. (2004). 
140 See Cook, supra note 136.  
141 See Vance, Jr., supra note 137, at 15.  
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1. Cryptographic Envelope Security Would Sufficiently Guard 
The Privacy Concerns That Encryption Was Meant To 
Address 
 
The most prominent concern for Tim Cook is the possibility that 
Apple can be compelled to produce a master key that would fall 
into the wrong hands, creating the ability for anyone to be able to 
unlock any Apple device.142 This important concern can be met by 
restrictive control of the process of access, even once the master 
key is built through a multi-layered system for accessing 
encrypted private information.   
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, additional methods can 
be used to balance the rights of a citizen with the necessity of law 
enforcement to be able to access information with execution of a 
valid warrant.143 The “cryptographic envelope” method is an 
integral part of striking the appropriate balance that will address 
this issue.144 This method creates “key[s]” that could decrypt data 
in a series of “nested” envelopes, similar to the concept of “Russian 
dolls,” with one envelope being outside of the next and only 
accessible through the use of a specific “key” in the possession of 
independent key-holders.  Essentially, such a method would work 
like this:  
Suppose, for example, we put the filesystem key in an envelope 
sealed with the FBI’s public key, and then put that sealed envelope 
 
142 See Cook, supra note 136.  
143 See Compliance with Court Orders Act, S._, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016); Digital 
Security Commission Act, H.R. 4615, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016). See also Neema Singh 
Guliani, 4 Problems with Creating a Commission on Encryption, ACLU. ORG (Mar. 9, 2016, 
4:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/4-problems-
creating-commission-encryption; Mark Jaycox, EFF Opposes McCaul-Warner Encryption 
Comm’n, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/eff-
opposes-mccaul-warner-encryption-commission. The second piece of federal legislation, 
dubbed the “Digital Security Commission Act,” was fashioned in such a way to establish a 
“National Commission on Security and Technology challenges in the legislative branch to 
examine “the intersection of security and digital security and communication technology in 
a systemic, holistic way.” See Digital Security Commission Act. Essentially, this legislation 
was aimed only at examining the issues we already know to exist by appointing various 
individuals to man each position of the board who were knowledgeable in various fields 
relevant to the issue of search and seizure of data encryption. See id. After further 
examination of the issue, the Commission would prepare several reports that would be used 
for tackling the issue in the future. See id. While the Act garnered bipartisan support from 
both the Senate and the House, there has been sharp criticism asserting that the 
commission’s mission was “overly broad.” Id. Moreover, the Commission would simply 
“prolong the encryption conversation,” in a time where the American people need answers.   
144 See VANCE, JR., supra note 4, at 16. 
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inside another envelope, this time sealed with the manufacturer’s 
public key . . . To start with, the drive can no longer be decrypted 
unilaterally by the FBI. The FBI doesn’t have the manufacturer’s 
private key, it can’t open the outer envelope. The drive also can’t 
be unilaterally decrypted by the manufacturer. Although the 
manufacturer can open the outer envelope, only the FBI can open 
the inner one to retrieve the filesystem key. Decryption of the drive 
(at least, without knowledge of the user’s password) now 
cryptographically requires both organizations to work with each 
other—all but eliminating the possibility of criminal misuse by 
insiders, or institutional misuse. 145 
The “cryptographic envelope” method would ensure that 
consumer’s privacy would be thoroughly protected.   
Another simpler way of thinking about this cryptographic 
envelope method is to analogize to a safety box at a bank.  A safety 
lock box requires two keys to be accessed: one belonging to the 
owner of the contents of the box and the other belonging to the 
bank where the box is stored and protected.  The two key system 
means that the owner of the box is required to go to the bank and 
ask for access to their lock box.  When the person’s credentials are 
verified, the employee of the bank will bring them to their lock box 
and insert their key.  At that time, the owner of the contents of the 
lock box will insert their own key, and with both keys in place, the 
box is unlocked. 
The safeguards afforded by the cryptographic method balance 
the right of citizens to be secure in their private information stored 
on cell phones and the need for law enforcement’s ability to 
appropriately, and with only with the requisite authorization, 
access information that is suspected to be used in furtherance of 
criminal investigations.146  
 
 
145 See Matt Tait, An Approach to Jim Comey’s Technical Challenge, LAWFARE INST. 
(Apr. 27, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/approach-james-comeys-technical-
challenge. 
146 See Nancy Gibbs & Lev Grossman, Here’s the Full Transcript of TIME’s Interview 
with Apple CEO Tim Cook, TIME MAGAZINE (Mar. 17, 2016), http://time.com/4261796/tim- 
cook-transcript/ (“Let’s say they have a problem with you. They can come to you and say, 
open your phone. And one way is for it to be between the government and you. Then you 
can, I don’t know, they could pass a law that says you have to do it, or you have to do it or 
there’s some penalty, or something. That’s for somebody else to decide. But it does seem 
like it should be between you and them.”).  
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2. Civil Sanctions Are Also Necessary To Incentivize 
Companies to Comply With Law Enforcement 
  
Indeed, “privacy comes at a cost,” but the burden of such cost 
should be borne by those best situated to carry the weight.147 The 
burden falls rightfully on the shoulders of those manufacturing the 
products that dangerously hinder the ability of law enforcement to 
investigate and prosecute criminal activities.  Accordingly, an 
obligation to build a bypass for encryption for all devices along 
with civil sanctions for the failure to meet the obligation would be 
another integral part of the proposed legislation.  Essentially, this 
“would be no different conceptually than legislation that requires 
products to be safe, buildings to be constructed with exits and 
egresses that satisfy specific requirements, and roads to have 
maximum speed limits.”148 In fact, various states and agencies 
have proposed the use of civil sanctions in helping to find a 
solution to the production of encrypted technology.149 New York 
State, in particular, has seen some serious consideration.   
All of the district attorneys in New York have proposed a specific 
provision that would mandate that “[a]ny smartphone that is 
manufactured on or after . . . [a certain date], and sold or leased in 
New York, shall be capable of being decrypted and unlocked by its 
manufacturer or its operating system provider.”150 New York 
Assembly Bill A.8093A proposed an amendment to the New York 
General Business Laws to require that any seller or lessor of a 
“smartphone . . . that is not capable of being decrypted and 
unlocked by its manufacturer or its operating system provider . . . 
[be] subject . . . to a civil penalty of . . . [$2,500 per] smartphone . . . 
if it . . . [can be] demonstrated that the seller or lessor . . . knew at 
the time of the sale or lease that the smartphone was not capable 
of being decrypted and unlocked . . . .”151 Violations of this law 
would be enforced either by the district attorney of the county in 
which the sale or lease occurred or by the state Attorney 
 
147 Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). 
148 SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION & PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 4, at 15. 
149 See id. at 24-26 (describing proposals from several states). See, e.g. Assemb. 
A.8093A, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); Assemb. 1681, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); 
H.R. 1040, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016). 
150 VANCE, JR., supra note 4, at Appendix I. 
151 N.Y. Assemb. A.8093A. 
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General.152 Essentially, this would cause the profit from producing 
and selling iPhones with default encryption to be dwarfed by the 
penalty that would need to be paid for violation of the encryption 
provisions.  
California Assembly Bill 1681 is, for all intents and purposes, 
the same as New York Assembly Bill A.8093A,153 but it was 
amended to prohibit any manufacturer or operating system 
provider who pays the civil penalty from passing on any portion of 
it to smartphone purchasers, so that companies cannot shift the 
financial burdens to the consumers.154 Essentially, the California 
bill would give law enforcement the authority to penalize the 
manufacturers, like Apple and Google, who are directly 
responsible for marketing a product with default-encryption.155  
One important distinguishing feature of the California bill from 
its New York counterpart is the fact that the California bill would 
only impose a penalty for each instance in which a smartphone 
could not be decrypted pursuant to a court order decreasing the 
number of situations where the civil penalty would be imposed.156 
As a result, the financial burden that would be borne by the 
manufacturer would be as small or severe as the number of 
instances where the government required assistance to enter into 
the phone’s encryption.157  
The imposition of civil sanctions would incentivize tech 
companies to manufacture products that may be decrypted by 
simply changing their cost-benefit analyses.  Whereas it is still 
profitable to manufacture and sell encrypted devices, by imposing 
a civil sanction, the production of the same phone may result in a 
loss of profit.  The new proposal would lead to a situation where 
the manufacturer would be incentivized to cooperate in the 
balance between the interests of private citizens and law 
enforcement.   
The adoption of the aforementioned safeguards would restrict 
the scope of law enforcement’s ability to access private information 
and incentivize companies, like Apple and Google, to manufacture 
 
152 Id.  
153 See id.; Cal. Assemb. 1681.  
154 Cal. Assemb. 1681.  
155 See id.  
156 See id. 
157 See id.  
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products that would promise both the privacy and security of their 
customers.  The adoption of legislation with these components 
serves the interests of all parties, which would enable companies, 
like Apple and Google, to find solace in the fact that society has 
asserted its will by a fair congressional vote.158  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Law enforcement and companies, like Apple, must take the lead 
on this issue that touches the lives of just about every single 
American citizen.  While there are competing interests on both 
sides, those interests do not have to be dichotomous.  While it is 
clear that there is no way to find a solution where one side will not 
have to compromise or to create a system without unintentional 
vulnerabilities,159 in the end, the effort set forth will aid in 
upholding the rights and freedoms that our government has 
protected for centuries.  
While criminal or even national security interests are not 
enough, on their own, to justify the judicial orders originally 
sought by law enforcement, the Framers of the Constitution 
envisioned a legislative means of confronting this issue.  These 
highly divisive issues must be tried in the appropriate arena—
Congress—and not left to the judiciary to “fill in gaps in the law” 
by forcing such political discussion to be decided by the Court.160 
Legislation tapping into cryptographic envelope technology would 
account for all of the aforementioned competing interests and 
would strike the necessary balance between the citizen’s right to 
 
158 See Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 58, at 3 (“If this 
order is permitted to stand, it will only be a matter of days before some other prosecutor, in 
some other important case, before some other judge, seeks a similar order using this case 
as precedent. Once the floodgates open, they cannot be closed, and the device security that 
Apple has worked so tirelessly to achieve will be unwound without so much as a 
congressional vote.”). 
159 Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As Encryption Spreads, U.S. Grapples with 
Clash Between Privacy, Security, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-encryption-spreads-us-
worries-about-access-to-data-for-investigations/2015/04/10/7c1c7518-d401-11e4-a62f-
ee745911a4ff_story.html?tid=a_inl.   
160 Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance, supra note 58, at 14. 
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privacy and law enforcement’s duty to provide security to its 
citizens. 
 
